1. Uzbekistan’s Potato Import Structure (Recent Years)
Uzbekistan’s demand for potatoes is roughly 4 million t per year, while domestic harvests run between 3.2 and 3.7 million t. The gap has been filled by fast‑growing imports that climbed from under 50 000 t in 2016 to about:
| Year | Estimated imports | Main suppliers (descending order) |
|---|---|---|
| 2020 | ≈ 421 000 t | Kazakhstan, Iran, Pakistan |
| 2021 | ≈ 500 000 t | Kazakhstan (~128 000 t), Iran (~127 000 t), Pakistan (~100 000 t) |
| 2022 | ≈ 450 000 t | Pakistan (~258 000 t), Kazakhstan (~96 000 t), Kyrgyzstan, Russia |
| 2023 | ≈ 520 000 t | Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan |
| 2024 | ≈ 703 000 t | Kazakhstan (~520 000 t), Pakistan (~111 000 t), Kyrgyzstan (~71 000 t) |
Seasonality
- January–May: stocks of local potatoes are low; Pakistan’s fresh winter crop dominates imports and drives prices down.
- June–August: local harvest covers demand; imports fall to a minimum.
- September–February: Kazakhstan’s autumn crop becomes the chief external source; volumes rise again.
Russia’s share never exceeds a few percent and has been shrinking.
2. Competitive Factors
| Factor | Russia | Kazakhstan | Pakistan |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cost & price | Higher production costs; long haul; rarely price‑competitive. | Moderate costs; cheap transport across the border; offers ~US $80 / t in bumper‑crop years. | Lowest costs; two crops in some regions; can undercut the market and curb price spikes. |
| Seasonality | Autumn harvest; limited export surplus in winter. | Autumn harvest; main exports in autumn/winter; expanding storage extends season to spring. | Winter/spring harvest; ideal for Uzbekistan’s Feb–May deficit. |
| Storage potential | Adequate facilities but serves domestic market first. | Storage capacity expanding fast, enabling year‑round exports. | Limited cold storage; typically ships immediately after harvest. |
| Logistics | Long railway route via Kazakhstan. | Direct land border; very short trucking/rail distance. | 1 500 km road through Afghanistan; costs drop if the Termez–Kabul–Peshawar railway opens (target 2027). |
| Trade policy | No special preferences; sanctions raise costs. | Close regional ties but prone to ad‑hoc export bans. | Growing political and trade rapprochement with Uzbekistan; minimal tariff barriers. |
| Market role in Uzbekistan | Marginal (≤ 5 %). | Currently dominant (up to 74 % in 2024). | Key challenger; has exceeded 50 % in peak seasons. |
3. External Forces
- Sanctions & geopolitics. Western sanctions inflate Russian costs and shift its focus inward, weakening its export capacity.
- Climate volatility. Drought years cut Kazakhstan’s yields, opening room for Pakistani supply; floods in Pakistan can do the opposite.
- Infrastructure projects. The planned Termez–Kabul–Peshawar railway could slash Pakistan–Uzbekistan freight costs by ~40 % and days‑in‑transit by five, eroding Kazakhstan’s logistic edge.
- Uzbek self‑sufficiency policy. Tashkent aims to meet domestic demand by 2027 via higher yields and more cold storage. Even partial success would shrink the import pie every supplier is fighting over.
4. Five‑Year Outlook
- Russia. Its share is already negligible and is likely to disappear entirely (< 10 % chance of a rebound).
- Pakistan vs Kazakhstan.
- Base case (most probable). Imports remain at roughly 0.3–0.5 million t per year. Pakistan strengthens its winter/spring niche and captures 30–50 % of total imports, while Kazakhstan holds 40–60 % thanks to proximity and storage investments.
- Pro‑Pakistan scenario (≈ 30 % probability). The new railway opens on time, Kazakhstan faces one or two poor harvests, and Pakistani exporters improve quality control. Pakistan’s share rises above 60 % by 2029, relegating Kazakhstan to second place.
- Pro‑Kazakhstan scenario (≈ 20 %). Strong Kazakh crops plus repeat export bans lifted swiftly; Afghanistan transit disruptions hurt Pakistan. Kazakhstan retains 70–80 % of the market.
- Other players. Kyrgyzstan, Iran and Afghanistan expand but will remain secondary suppliers.
- Domestic production wildcard. If Uzbekistan meets its self‑sufficiency target, imports could plunge, forcing both Pakistan and Kazakhstan to fight for a much smaller residual market.
Bottom line: Pakistani potatoes are very likely to entrench themselves as a co‑leader on the Uzbek market, entirely supplanting Russian exports and sharing the field with Kazakhstan. A complete takeover is possible but hinges on logistics upgrades and Kazakh yield shocks; the more plausible end‑state is a two‑horse race where Pakistan dominates winter–spring and Kazakhstan autumn–winter, with Uzbekistan gradually trimming overall imports as its own yields rise.
Prepared with data and analyses from: Uzbekistan State Statistics Committee; EastFruit (2020 – 2025 market briefs); Kun.uz, Daryo, Kursiv.kz news reports; official releases of the Ministries of Agriculture of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan; media coverage of the Termez–Kabul–Peshawar railway project; and publicly available FAO and UN Comtrade statistics.
